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Abstract
This paper reports the evidence from an experiment which takes advantage
of the rich informational structure of the so-called Chinos Game, a traditional
parlour game played in many countries. In the experiment subjects receive a
binary private signal and have to guess the sum of these signals. We compare
two constant-sum versions of the Chinos Game. In one version, which we call
Preemption Scenario, the first player who guesses right wins the prize. In the
alternative version, called the Copycat Scenario, the last player who guesses
right wins the prize. While it is straightforward to see that the Preemption
Scenario has a unique and fully revealing equilibrium, in all the equilibria of
the Copycat Scenario first movers optimally hide their private information.
However, our experimental evidence shows that subjects “lie” in the Copycat
Scenario (i.e., systematically distort behavior relative to equilibrium play) and
they are successful at doing it, despite that benefits from lying are diminishing
as the game proceeds.
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1 Introduction
The analysis of positional advantages in sequential markets with incomplete
(asymmetric) information has been the object of an extensive discussion within the
theory of Industrial Organization.1 This literature has been enriched by the the-
oretical and empirical research on strategic information transmission pioneered by
Crawford and Sobel (1982), where better informed first movers have the possibility
of manipulating the information they hold via the actions they take.2 These issues
are of primary importance in a wide variety of economic scenarios -e.g. in financial
markets, where traders deal with information as their main economic resource. But
other contexts display this same trade-off, such as when competing firms have to de-
cide on the timing of adoption of a new technology -or a specific marketing strategy-
under some uncertainty over the underlying technology or consumer preferences.
In all these situations, there are two conflicting considerations faced by early
movers:
(i) On the one hand, choosing early on a revealing strategy may have a preemption
component, in that it could reduce the strategic possibilities of late movers
(Hopenhayn and Squintani, 2011). For instance, in financial markets, traders
may want to maximize the chances to buy/sell the right assets in the right
moment and, by doing so, eliminate the arbitrage opportunities of later movers.
(ii) On the other hand, early movers may prefer to choose a non-revealing strategy
and thus hide their private information. This may happen, for instance, in
situations in which firms compete under uncertain demand and early movers
may suffer from revealing their private information if the latter is not perfectly
correlated with that of their competitors (Gal-Or, 1987).
To analyze these issues, this paper considers a strategic environment that, build-
ing upon the related experimental literature, is richer than the received setup but
still manageable and intuitive. Specifically, we design an experiment inspired on the
3-player version of the so-called Chinos Game (Feri et al., 2011; Ponti and Carbone,
2009). This is a simple game played by kids in many countries in which players hold
a private signal (coins, or pebbles, they hide in their hand) and have to guess, in
some pre-specified order, their total sum. At the time a player has to produce her
guess, she is informed about her own signal and the guesses of all her predecessors.3
We study two versions of this game. In one of them, labeled the Preemption
Scenario (PS), the winner is set to be the first player whose guess coincides with
the sum of signals or, in case no player gets the sum of signals right, the prize goes
1Gal-Or (1985), for example, shows that first movers have a positional advantage in games with
strategic substitutabilities; Rasmusen and Yoon (2012) proves an analogous conclusion when the
amount of information first movers hold is only modestly superior than that of their competitors.
2There is also another strand of literature that studies positional advantages from a psycho-
logical point of view. See, for example, Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta (2010), Gill and Prowse
(2012), Kocher et al. (2012) or Feri et al. (2013).
3This game was first analyzed theoretically by Pastor-Abia et al. (2001).
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to the last player in the sequence.4 As the alternative treatment, we consider a
second version of the Chinos Game that we call the Copycat Scenario (CS). The CS
shares the same game-form of the PS, the only difference being that the winner now
coincides with the last player whose guess coincides with the sum of the signals or,
in case nobody gets it right, with the first player in line.
However stylized, our experimental setup captures an essential dilemma faced by
agents in many signaling situations. To fix ideas, consider the following example.
Example: A fresh “window” for investment opens up in a certain market, asso-
ciated to some new technology developed elsewhere. (For example, faster
Internet access allows new ways to provide entertainment to the household.)
A priori, there are a finite number of possible approaches that can be pur-
sued. In practice, however, only one of them is really technologically adequate
(or matches sufficiently well consumer preferences). That is, all other firms
perform much worse and, for simplicity, we assume that comparably so.
To start with, there are three firms operating in this market. Each of them
receives a binary signal in the set {0,1}, indicating how to address a partic-
ular aspect of the problem. In the end, as it turns out, the right investment
approach is uniquely characterized by the sum of the three signals received by
the firms. In this respect, all three firms are symmetric. There are, however,
two other respects in which they are not. On the one hand, they have to make
their investment choice in some pre-specified order and this is an important
source of asymmetry. On the other, one of them enjoys a dominant position
in the market, in the sense that, if no adequate approach is undertaken by
any firm, then the dominant firm captures the market with its suboptimal
approach.
In principle, one may combine order- and dominance-asymmetry in different
ways. Here, for the sake of focus, we consider the following two possibilities,
which are those that arguably highlight most starkly the issues involved by
balancing preemption and dominance.
PS. The dominant firm moves last and early movers enjoy a preemption ad-
vantage, i.e. if a firm develops the right approach first, it captures the
whole market.
CS. The dominant firm moves first and late movers enjoy a copycat advantage,
i.e. if a firm is the last one to develop the right approach, it captures the
whole market.
The two possibilities considered in the above examples provide economic illustra-
tions of the game-theoretical setups that will be formally introduced below. These
two games allow us to explore in detail, both theoretically and experimentally, the
tension between pooling (i.e., hiding own private information with the aim of ac-
quiring an informational advantage over followers) and fooling (i.e., manipulating
4In the commonly played Chinos Game, if no player gets the sum of the signals right, the game
is repeated afresh. We introduce this modification to the original game-form to avoid across-game
strategic considerations that would have substantially complicated the analysis.
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own message with the aim of deceive followers) that is the the core of many sig-
naling setups in economics. They help us understand, in particular, how certain
off-equilibrium behavior (an attempt to fool the opponents) may naturally arise in
the latter case but not in the former, although fooling behavior, per se, cannot be
justified on the ground of some equilibrium behavior. Indeed, as we shall see, such
an “irrational” behavior is found in our experiment and also pays off, at least in the
early instances of repeated play.
A first point to note is that, even though both PS and CS share the same game-
form, their contrasting outcome functions dictate completely opposite equilibrium
behavior to first movers, Thus, as our theoretical analysis in Section 2.2 will show,
while in PS they must fully reveal their private information, in CS they must hide
it. In fact, these games are, in a certain sense, symmetric. On the one hand, player
1 in PS and player 3 in CS (we call them the “target players”) have exactly the
same equilibrium strategy, i.e. to rely on their own signals alone when formulating
their guesses.
On the other hand, at equilibrium, the strategies of player 3 in PS and player 1
in CS (we call them the “residual claimants”) should carry no informational content
about their own signal. This is because player 3’s winning chances in PS do not
depend on her own action, while player 1 in CS should optimally shade (she can
only win if other fail to guess correctly).
Finally, concerning player 2, her intermediate position in the sequence yields the
most delicate strategic trade-off between revealing and shading. In PS, “responding
to her signal” (and hence revealing it) should be optimal for player 2, but this is
subject to the additional consideration that it never pays to repeat player 1’s guess.
Instead, in CS player 2 faces an even more complicated problem: his optimal guess
must involve shading, although a very specific one, i.e. her pooling strategy must
maximizes her winning chances compared to any other such strategy.
In summary, PS and CS can be seen as “twin” games in the sense that each player
position in one game has a corresponding position in the other. More precisely, they
are inverse-twin games because, for players 1 and 3, the symmetric player position
in the other game is the opposite one. As we shall see, by comparing the implications
of the two game-forms, such inverse-twin feature will help understand the key notion
of positional advantage. Note that, in our model, the players who hold a positional
advantage in the most clear-cut manner are the target players – i.e. player 1 in PS,
and player 3 in CS. This, in turn, is reflected in the fact that, in equilibrium, they
play the same strategy and hold the same (highest) winning probability in both
games. Indeed, the fact that they enjoy such a high winning probability is also
confirmed, at a qualitative level, by our experimental evidence.
The experiments, however, also show significant disparities between actual and
equilibrium behavior, as well as in actual and equilibrium winning probabilities.
(This will be clearly shown in Figure 1 below.) To anticipate our conclusions in this
respect, these can be succinctly summarized as follows.
• The target player in CS (player 3) does better than in PS (player 1), because
the former can exploit/decode deviations from equilibrium while the latter
cannot.
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• The residual claimants in CS (player 1) and in PS (player 3) do better than
predicted at equilibrium because they “passively” benefit from the (unavoid-
able) mistakes of others.
• The middle player (player 2) does worse in CS than in PS because
(a) she can hardly profit from the mistakes of others in either case, but
(b) her decision is substantially more complex in the CS (and hence worse-
tailored to available evidence).
In sum, we shall argue that the combined analysis of PS and CS provides an ideal
environment to understand signaling in multilateral context. In particular, it can
shed light on the tension between pooling and fooling that – because of bounded
rationality and the non-equilibrium behavior entailed – plays a key role in so many
real-world applications. Conceptually, the notion of fooling is related to that of
deception discussed in the literature (Crawford, 2003; Gneezy, 2005; Sobel, 2017),
in that it presumes some “model of opponents’ mind.” Indeed, our experiments show
that first movers in the CS often try to fool their followers and they gain by it.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief
synopsis of the theory underlying the experiment. In Section 3 we describe the ex-
perimental design, while Section 4 summarizes our main results. These include a
comparison of the winning probabilities of “twins position” in each game and also
the effects of various out-off-equilibrium behaviors, as follows. Our results indicate
-among others- that i) in both games residual claimants win more frequently than
in equilibrium -which is already an indirect sign of the relevance of off-equilibrium
behavior and that ii) in CS first-movers successfully fool their followers, but the
benefits from strategic manipulation are diminishing as the game proceeds. Finally,
Section 5 concludes, followed by Appendices containing the experimental instruc-
tions, the derivation of the equilibrium predictions, and further statistical evidence.
2 The model
2.1 Game-form
Three players, indexed by i ∈ N = {1,2,3}, privately receive an iid signal, si ∈{0,1}, with si = 1 with probability p ∈ (0,1), uniform across players. Players act in
sequence, as indicated by their indices, and have to make a guess, gi ∈ G = {0,1,2,3},
over the sum of players’ private signals, σ = ∑i si. By the time player i makes her
guess, she is informed of her own signal, si, and the guesses of her predecessors,
gj, j < i.
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2.2 Equilibrium prediction
In what follows, for both PS and CS, we characterize the Perfect Bayesian Equi-
librium (PBE) guessing sequences.5 By analogy with our experimental conditions,
we posit p > 23 (with p = 34 in the experiment). This assumption greatly simplifies
the analysis, since the distribution over the sum of k signals (binomially distributed
as Bin(k, p), for k ≤ 2) is unimodal. Specifically, if Mk(p) is the mode of Bin(k, p)
-i.e., the most likely realization of the sum of k signals- then, for all p > 23 , M1(p) = 1
and M2(p) = 2.
In PS the prize goes to the first player who guesses right, i.e., for whom gi =
σ. Otherwise, the prize goes to player 3. Given the realized vector of signals(s1, s2, s3), let gT = (gTi ) denoting the PBE guessing sequence of treatment T, with
T ∈ {PS,CS}.
Prediction for PS. In PS all PBE share the following guessing sequence, gPS ∶
gPS1 = s1 + 2, gPS2 = gPS1 − 1 and gPS3 ∈ G. (1)
For a complete derivation of the PBE, see Appendix B. In words, player 1 has
an incentive to maximize her chance to guess right by choosing the fully revealing
strategy gPS1 = s1 +M2(p) = s1 + 2. As for player 2, if she observes g1 = 2, she then
learns that s1 = 0. Thus, in order to maximize her chances to guess right, she should
choose g2 = 1 if s2 = 0 and choose g2 = 2 if s2 = 1. However, if she repeats player
1’s choice (i.e., if g2 = 2) she gets a null payoff. Therefore, it is also optimal for
player 2 to choose g2 = 1 when s2 = 1. Likewise, if player 2 observes g1 = 3, then
she learns that s1 = 1. Thus, in order to maximize her chances to guess right, she
should choose g2 = 2 if s2 = 0 and g2 = 3 if s2 = 1. However, since she is restricted by
the non repetition constraint (i.e., g2 = 3 does not pay), it is also optimal to choose
g2 = 2 when s2 = 1. Finally, any possible choice of the residual claimant player 3
is part of an equilibrium, since the payoffs of all players (including herself) do not
depend on g3.
The equilibrium properties of CS are summarized in the following
Prediction for CS. In CS all PBE share the following guessing sequence, gCS ∶
gCS1 ∈ G independent of s1, gCS2 = 2 and gCS3 = s3 + 2. (2)
For a complete derivation of the PBE, see Appendix B. In words, player 1 wins
only if both players 2 and 3 guess wrong. Thus, any pooling strategy by player
1 is consistent with a PBE. As for player 2, she only gets the prize if she guesses
right and player 3 does not repeat. Thus, player 2’s PBE strategy solves optimally
the trade-off between maximizing her winning chances and hiding her own signal to
player 3. If p > 2/3, this trade-off is solved by an optimal (pure) pooling strategy,
that prescribes gCS2 = 2 independent of s2 and g1. As for player 3, since both players
5 A complete description of the PBE equilibria strategies and beliefs can be found in Appendix
B.
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1 and 2 pool, in equilibrium she can only condition her play to her own signal and
prior probabilities. This, in turn, implies gCS3 = s3 +M2(p).
Let wTi denote player i’s ex-ante winning probability in treatment T ∈ {PS,CS},
conditional of any PBE of the corresponding treatment. As for PS, from (1) it follows
that wPS1 = p2, wPS2 = 2p(1 − p) and wPS3 = 1 − p2 − 2p(1 − p). If p = 3/4 (as in the
experiment), then
wPS1 = 0.56, wPS2 = 0.38 and wPS3 = 0.06.
From (2) it follows that wCS1 = 1− p2 − 2p2(1− p); wCS2 = 2p2(1− p) and wCS3 = p2.
If p = 3/4, then
wCS1 = 0.16, wCS2 = 0.28 and wCS3 = 0.56.
Notice that
1. Target players do not rely on others’ guesses, but only on their own priors.
Therefore, their strategy (and the corresponding winning probability) is ex-
actly the same.
2. Player 2 is better off in PS despite the no repetition constraint, since, in PS,
player 1’s guess is fully revealing, while in CS it has no informational content.
It is player 2 who faces the trade-off between revealing and shading, which is
optimally solved in favor of the former (latter) in PS (CS), respectively.
3. This, in turn, implies that, as for residual claimants, player 1 in CS is better
off than player 3 in PS.
3 The experimental design
3.1 Sessions
Four experimental sessions (two sessions per treatment) were run at the Labo-
ratory for Theoretical and Experimental Economics (LaTEx), at the Universidad
de Alicante. A total of 96 subjects (24 per session) were recruited among the un-
dergraduate population of the University, mainly, undergraduate students from the
Economics Department with no (or very little) prior exposure to game theory. De-
pending on the session, they played 20 rounds of either CS or PS, between-subjects.
The experimental sessions were computerized. Instructions were provided by a self-
paced, interactive computer program that introduced and described the experiment.
Subjects were also provided with a written copy of the experimental instructions,
identical to what they were reading on the screen.6
After each round, all subjects were informed of all payoff-relevant information,
that is, i) the signal and choice profiles for all group members and, consequently,
ii) the identity of the winner. In addition, they were also provided with a “history
6The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
A copy of the instructions, translated into English, can be found in Appendix A.
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table” tracking down the sequence of signals and guesses of all group members in
previous rounds.
3.2 Matching
In all 20 rounds, group composition and role assignment were kept constant.
Both these important features of the experimental design were publicly announced
at the beginning of each session. In every round, each player’s signal was the outcome
of an iid random draw with p = 3/4. Given these experimental conditions, we were
able to collect, for each treatment, 16 independent observations.
3.3 Payment
All monetary payoffs in the experiment are expressed in Spanish Pesetas (SP: 1
e=166 SP). All subjects received 1000 SP just for showing up. The fixed prize for
each round was set equal to 100 SP. Average winnings in the experiment were 1660
SP (i.e., 10 e), for an experiment that lasted, on average, 45 minutes.
4 Results
4.1 Aggregate behavior
Figure 1 reports the winning frequencies by treatment and player position and
compares them with the corresponding equilibrium probabilities. For each player
position i, let wˆTi be the observed winning frequency in treatment T ∈ {PS,CS},
with ∆wTi = wˆTi − wTi denoting the difference between observed frequencies and
equilibrium probabilities.
Figure 1: Observed and theoretical winning probabilities
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As for PS, player 1 (3) wins less (more) frequently than in equilibrium (both
differences are significant at 1% confidence using binomial tests), whereas no signif-
icant difference is found for player 2. As for CS, it is player 1 who wins at a higher
frequency, whereas player 2 wins less (again, these differences are significant at 1%
confidence), while there is no significant difference between observed and predicted
winning frequencies for player 3.
Some considerations are in order at this point. As for target players, along the
equilibrium path, both players 1 (3) in PS (CS) should guess based on own private
information only: the former because she is the first in line, the latter because
both her predecessors should optimally shade their private signal. However, if early
movers in CS play off-equilibrium -and, by doing so, partially reveal something
about their private signal- players’ 3 optimal response consists in exploiting her
predecessors’ signaling. Whether player 3 in CS can benefit from her predecessors’
deviations -and, consequently, gaining a comparative advantage with respect to her
“twin player” in PS- depends on her ability to correctly “decode” such deviations.
Along similar lines, also residual claimants may be affected asymmetrically by
off-equilibrium play. While in PS player 3 is really “residual”, in the sense that she
wins the prize independently of her own behavior in that none of her predecessors has
guessed right, off-equilibrium signaling from player 1 in CS may, or may not, increase
her winning chances. To the extent she is able to “fool” her successors (this is what
Sobel (2017) defines as deception), she may outperform her equilibrium winning
chances; if, instead, her signaling is correctly decoded by successors, off-equilibrium
play may be detrimental.
Finally, comparing the strategic situation of players 2 in PS and CS, remember
that the behavior of the former is restricted by the non repetition constraint. By
contrast, player 2 in CS is restricted by her successor: if both make the same guess,
it is player 3 who gets the prize. Thus, player 2 in CS faces the trade-off between
maximizing her winning chances and hiding her own signal from player 3. Moreover,
player 2 in CS must also minimize the chances that player 3 repeats her own choice.
Thus, the nature of the restriction is inherently more compelling in CS which, in
turn, implies that player 2’s theoretical winning probability in CS is lower (wPS2 =
0.37 and wCS2 = 0.28).
In what follows, we shall look at Figure 1 with the aim of identifying to which
extent off-equilibrium play affects players’ performance.
Result 1 (target players). The observed winning frequency of player 3 in CS
is significantly higher than that of player 1 in PS (at 5% confidence, Mann
Whitney test), although -in equilibrium- they should be exactly the same.
While player 1 in PS and player 3 in CS are in strategically similar positions,
when mistakes occur they are in drastically different ones. No significant differences
should be expected in a once-and-for-all play of the game: payoffs should be ap-
proximately equal. However, if the game is repeated over time and players can learn
the “deviation patterns” of others, player 3 in CS can profit from learning how to
decode such patterns, while player 1 in PS cannot. This manifests itself in the fact
that player 3 in CS obtains significantly higher payoffs than player 1 in PS.
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In other words, Result 1 indicates that player 3 in CS exploits her positional
advantage. This suggests that, in environments where there is conflict of incentives
among agents who act sequentially, late-movers may be able to properly use the
information obtained from predecessors’ mistakes and benefit from it.
Result 2 (residual claimants). In both treatments, residual claimants win more
compared with the theoretical prediction. There is no significant difference
between ∆wCS1 and ∆w
PS
3 .
Interestingly, both residual claimants -player 3 (1) in PS (CS), respectively- win
significantly more with respect to their equilibrium benchmark. This is already
an indirect evidence of suboptimal play on behalf of the other group members.
Remember that player 3 in PS -contrary to player 1 in CS- does not have any
possibility to influence others. Since the theoretical winning probabilities differ
across residual claimants (wPS3 = 0.06 and wCS1 = 0.16), we compare the differences
between observed and theoretical winning frequencies.
Since players’ payoff shares deviate significantly from those induced by equilib-
rium, significant deviations from equilibrium must occur. Who benefits from these
deviations? Residual claimants do. This means that these players residual role in
terms of the rule of the game (they win when others do not) gets transformed into
in an equal share in the residual payoffs that are left on the table when others make
mistakes.
Thus, there are no significant differences in the residual claimants’ performance,
compared with the equilibrium benchmark. However, there may be heterogeneity
across groups, so that some players 1 in CS could be more able to exploit their first-
mover advantage, compared to others. To check this conjecture, Result 3 compares
the performance between the 75% of best-performing residual claimants in PS and
CS.
Result 3 (best-performing residual claimants). For the best performing resid-
ual claimants, ∆wCS1 is significantly higher than ∆w
PS
3 (at 5% confidence).
Finally, in order to check whether the extra complexity of the restriction in
CS hurts player 2 compared to her counterpart in PS, we compare the differences
between observed and theoretical frequencies, ∆w2, in the following result.
Result 4 (intermediate players). ∆wCS2 is significantly lower than ∆w
PS
2 (at 1%
confidence).
As explained in Results 1-3, when mistakes occur, the payoff differences across
players in strategically similar positions in CS and PS are essentially due to ei-
ther differences in learning potential or differences in fooling/revealing potential.
Mistakes, however, also bring about an additional consequence: they complicate
the analysis of the strategic situation. The equilibrium can no longer be used to
predict/understand the behavior of others and, therefore, players must resort to
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decoding systematic patterns from past evidence. The difficulty of this endeavor
depends on how sharply defined are the incentives of the agents whose behavioral
patterns are to be decoded. In this sense, PS is much simpler than CS : in PS, any
player simply wants to guess right. In contrast, in CS, depending on the player
position, there are incentives both to guess right -for player 3 and, partially, for
player 2- and to hide information -for player 1 and, partially, for player 2. This is
why CS is the game where mistakes introduce higher complexity in the analysis.
And, given such complexity, the player most affected by it should be player 2, who
is simultaneously facing the need to guess right and hide private information. This
explains Result 4, which tells us that player 2 is the player whose payoff share falls
significantly below the equilibrium prediction.
4.2 Individual behavior
This section looks at two complementary informational dimensions, which play
different roles in the two treatments.
1. Signaling: the extent to which players’ guesses reveal their own private sig-
nals. This may appear in two forms: revealing, when own guesses are positively
correlated with own signals; or fooling, when own guesses are negatively cor-
related with own signals.
2. Decoding: the extent of players’ ability to gather the private information
held by their predecessors.
In principle, both forms of signaling, either revealing or fooling, are subopti-
mal in CS, as they give followers a chance to decode. By contrast, (no repetition
constrained) revealing is the only rational behavior in PS.
As we have just shown, off-equilibrium behavior has asymmetric effects in the
two game-forms under scrutiny:
• in PS, if player 1 fails to signal her private information, this may give her fol-
lowers improved winning chances, although her mistakes might mislead others,
giving rise to error cascades (Feri et al., 2011);
• in CS, if player 1 fails to hide her private information (by either revealing, or
fooling), this may give her followers improved winning chances conditional on
their ability to decode the signaling content of predecessors.
Given these considerations, we analyze subjects’ off-equilibrium behavior by way
of two complementary methods:
1. Correlation method. We compute i) the correlation between subjects’ own
private signals and guesses and ii) the correlation between own guesses and
those of predecessors. The former is a proxy of the signaling content of guesses;
the latter measures the extent of decoding.
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2. Actions classification method. We first partition actions according to their
signaling content. In PS we look at the consequences of player 1’s deviation
from her (fully revealing) optimal strategy; in CS we distinguish between re-
vealing and fooling on behalf of player 1 and look at the consequences of these
alternative behaviors on winning frequency profiles.
In what follows, we shall report the results of the correlation methods. The
analysis of the action classification method (to be considered as a robustness check)
can be found in Appendix B. There we find that i) in PS off-equilibrium play from
player 1 mostly favors player 2 and is reduced as the game proceeds and ii) in
CS fooling behavior from player 1 is successful, mostly at the expense of player 3
although also this phenomenon is drastically reduced in the last repetitions of the
game.
Let c(gi, si) (c(gi, gj), i < j) denote, respectively, the correlation coefficients be-
tween own guesses and signals (own and predecessors’ guesses) evaluated across the
20 rounds of play, where the former is a proxy of the degree with which a sub-
ject reveals her private signal and the latter captures the dependence of followers’
guesses on the information revealed by predecessors. Table 1 reports the estimated
coefficients of some OLS regressions,
pwini = α +∑
i
βi1c(gi, si) +∑
i
∑
j<i β
i,j
2 c(gi, gj) + uit, (3)
where the dependent variable, pwini, is the relative frequency of winning rounds for
the player i of some matching group. The most interesting fact is that, in CS, the
winning probability of player 1 (3) is decreasing (increasing) in c(g1, s1), respectively.
This result shows that player 3 gets hurt if player 1 fools.
Table 1: OLS regression of winning frequencies on correlations coefficients
PS CS
VARS. pwin1 pwin2 pwin3 pwin1 pwin2 pwin3
c(g1, s1) 0.144** -0.12 -0.024 -0.196* -0.124 0.319**
(0.052) (0.098) (0.1) (0.096) (0.084) (0.127)
c(g2, s2) 0.016 0.08 -0.096 -0.099 0.071 0.028
(0.065) ( -0.122) (0.124) ( -0.086 ) (0.075) (0.114)
c(g3, s3) -0.002 0.205 -0.204 -0.263** -0.171 0.434**
(0.091) (0.172) (0.175) (0.109) (0.096) (0.145)
c(g2, g1) -0.01 0.005 0.005 0.033 -0.033 0
(0.048) (0.092) (0.093 ) (0.074) (0.065) (0.098)
c(g3, g1) 0.061 0.262 -0.323* -0.024 0.047 -0.023
(0.082) (0.156) (0.158) (0.093) (0.081) (0.123)
c(g3, g2) -0.13 -0.161 0.291* 0.024 -0.402*** 0.378*
(0.075) (0.142) (0.144) (0.128) (0.112) (0.17)
Constant 0.352*** 0.374*** 0.274** 0.425*** 0.368*** 0.207
(0.055) (0.104) (0.106) (0.089) (0.078) (0.119)
Obs. 16 16 16 16 16 16
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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As Table 1 shows, while in PS the coefficient of c(g1, s1) is positive (this indi-
cating that revealing pays off for player 1), the reverse occurs in CS. In addition,
in CS the impact of c(g1, s1) on pwin3 is positive and highly significant. We are
interested in determining whether these results from CS are due to the fact that fool-
ing behavior is successful (harmful) for player 1 (player 3), rather than revealing is
harmful (successful) for player 1 (player 3), respectively. With this objective, Table
6 in Appendix B decomposes the effect of c(g1, s1) into two components, depending
on whether it is positive or negative. As Table 6 shows, we see that fooling has an
impact on winning prospects of players 1 and 3 while revealing has not.
5 Conclusion
This paper builds upon the intriguing structure of a parlor game that enriches the
strategic content of classic models of signaling. The comparison between PS and
its “opposite twin”, CS, unravels, in its simplicity, the tension between signaling
and shading, between pooling and fooling. If we focus on target players (i.e., those
who enjoy a positional advantage) and residual claimants (i.e., those who suffer a
positional disadvantage), in PS there are no confounding factors determining how
players’ performance is affected by off-equilibrium behavior. This is due to the fact
that the target player 1 exclusively suffers from her own deviations (regardless of
others’ choices) and the residual claimant player 3 exclusively benefits from others’
deviations (regardless of her own choice). By contrast, in CS the effects of out-
of-equilibrium behavior for targets and residual claimants are more intricate: in
addition from suffering from her own deviations, the target player 3 may either
benefit or be harmed by predecessors’ deviations, to the extent to which she is able
to properly decode or is fooled. Relatedly, deviations from equilibrium of the residual
claimant player 1 can also affect her performance, either negatively (if successors
are, to some extent, able to infer her private information) or positively (if she is
able to fool her followers). In this sense, PS may be conceived as a benchmark
and the comparison of CS with PS allows us to study whether (out-of-equilibrium)
manipulation pays off.
In this respect, the relative success of fooling behavior in CS, against the equilib-
rium prediction, is somewhat disturbing for game theory and can only be interpreted
as the consequence of some “common knowledge of irrationality” on behalf of the
players, together with the fact that, for the residual claimant player 1, fooling is
relatively “cheap” in that her objective is fooling the others rather than being the
only one guessing right (Crawford, 2003; Gneezy et al., 2016). This consideration
notwithstanding, it is important to notice that, in our experimental setting, fooling
pays off in CS, although only in the short-run. This pattern confirms the findings of
Forsythe et al. (1999) in that buyers who are most frequently lied to are less gullible
in the continuation of the experiment, although subjects who observe that others
are particularly gullible, do not exploit the observation with more lying.
Overall, we find that first movers’ gains from fooling are offset by their positional
disadvantage and that followers are more successful in decoding prior messages as the
game proceeds. This may confine fooling as a short-run phenomenon. Additionally,
the asymmetric effects of fooling and revealing strategy echoes the results of Sutter
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(2009), suggesting that also truthtelling might be a tool for strategic manipulation.
In sum, our simple games of incomplete information embody -in a stylized setup-
the incentives to signal and shade one’s own private information that arise in most
interesting applications. In this respect, Result 2 plays, essentially, a reassuring
role: residual players in each game are symmetrically affected by mistakes. The
main insights then follow from Results 1, 3 and 4, all of which highlight a separate
important factor: Result 1 centers on coding, Result 3 on fooling, and Result 4
on complexity. To understand their role, we have considered pairs of agents who
are placed in strategically similar positions in each game, so that their respective
behavior predicted at a (mistake-free) equilibrium is similar as well. Admittedly,
the factors highlighted in our analysis are particularly stark because of the equally
stark contrast displayed by the two games under consideration. However, the same
three factors should be at play in more complicated games as well.
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Appendix A
A1. Experimental Instructions
Part of the instructions common to PS and CS:
Welcome to the experiment! This is an experiment to study how people solve
decision problems. Our unique goal is to see how people act on average; not what
you in particular are doing. That is, we do not expect any particular behavior of you.
However, you should take into account that your behavior will affect the amount of
money you will earn throughout the experiment. These instructions explain the way
the experiment works and the way you should use your computer. Please do not
disturb the other participants during the course experiment. If you need any help,
please, raise your hand and wait quietly. You will be attended as soon as possible.
How to get money! This experimental session consists of 20 rounds in which
you and two additional persons in this room will be assigned to a group, that is
to say, including you there will be a total of three people in the group. You, and
each of the other two people, will be asked to make a choice. Your choice (and
the choices of the other two people in your group) will determine the amount of
money that you will earn after each round. Your group will remain the same during
the whole experiment. Therefore, you will be always playing with the same people.
During the experiment, your earnings will be accounted in pesetas. At the end of
the experiment you will be paid the corresponding amount of Euros that you have
accumulated during the experiment.
The game. Notice that you have been assigned a player number. Your player
number is displayed at the right of your screen. This number represents your player
position in a sequence of 3 (Player 1 moves first, Player 2 moves after Player 1 and
Player 3 moves after Players 1 and 2). Your position in the sequence will remain the
same during the entire experiment. At the beginning of each round, the computer
will assign to each person in your group (including yourself) either 0 tokens or 1
token. Within each group, each player is assigned 0 tokens with a probability of
25% and is assigned 1 token with a probability of 75%. The fact that a player is
assigned 0 tokens or 1 token is independent of what other players are assigned; that
is to say, the above probabilities are applied separately for each player.
At each round, the computer executes again the process of assignment of tokens
to each player as specified above. The number of tokens that each player is assigned
at any particular round does not depend at all on the assignments that he/she had in
other rounds. You will only know the number of tokens that you have been assigned
(0 or 1), and you will not know the number of tokens assigned to the other persons
in your group. The same rule applies for the other group members (each of them
will only know his/her number of tokens).
At each round you will be asked to make a guess over the total number of tokens
distributed among the three persons in your group (including yourself) at the current
round. The other members of your group will also be asked to make the same guess.
The order of the guesses corresponds to the sequence of the players in the group.
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That is to say: Player 1 makes his/her guess first, then Player 2 makes his/her
guess and, finally, Player 3 makes his/her guess. Moreover, you will make your
guess knowing the guesses of the players in your group that moved before yourself.
Therefore, Player 2 will know Player 1’s guess and Player 3 will know both Player
1 and Player 2’s guesses.
At each round there is a unique prize of 50 pesetas that will be assigned to one
player of the group. The remaining players will earn nothing.
Part of the instructions specific of PS:
The rule for assigning the prize in the group is as follows: (i) If for one or more
players of the group, the guess coincides with the total number of tokens distributed
in the group, the prize is assigned to the first player in the sequence who guessed
the total number of tokens. (ii) If there is no player whose guess coincides with the
total number of tokens in the group, the prize is assigned to Player 3.
Let us see examples of case (i): If all the three players guess the total number
of tokens, the prize is assigned to Player 1. If only Players 2 and 3 guess the total
number of tokens, the prize is assigned to Player 2. Obviously, if only one player
guesses the total number of tokens, the prize is assigned to her.
Part of the instructions specific of CS:
The rule for assigning the prize in the group is as follows: (i) If for one or more
players of the group, the guess coincides with the total number of tokens distributed
in the group, the prize is assigned to the last player in the sequence who guessed
the total number of tokens. (ii) If there is no player whose guess coincides with the
total number of tokens in the group, the prize is assigned to Player 1.
Let us see examples of case (i): If all the three players guess the total number
of tokens, the prize is assigned to Player 3. If only Players 1 and 2 guess the total
number of tokens, the prize is assigned to Player 2. Obviously, if only one player
guesses the total number of tokens, the prize is assigned to her.
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Appendix B
B1. Theory: Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE)
We focus on behavioral strategies, defined in the conventional fashion as a
mapping from information sets to (possibly probabilistic) choices. Let Hi denote
the collection of player i’s information sets. For player 1, we can simply writeH1 ≡ {h = s1 ∶ s1 = 0,1}, since she has only two information sets that can be associ-
ated to each of the possible realizations of s1. For players 2 and 3, information sets
can be defined as H2 ≡ {h = (g1, s2)} and H3 ≡ {h = (g1, g2, s3)}, respectively. Player
i’s behavioral strategy is denoted by γi ∶ Hi → ∆(G), where γhi (gi) stands for the
probability of choosing gi at information set h.
Next, we define players’ beliefs as systems of probabilities of signals conditional
on choices. Given that signals are iid and choices are publicly observed, we make the
simplifying assumption that later movers hold common beliefs of previous signals.
First, we have the system {µ1(g1)}g1∈G, where µ1(g1) ∈ [0,1] is the probability
associated (by players 2 and 3) to s1 = 1 when the choice of player 1 has been g1.
Analogously, we have {µ2(g1, g2)}g1,g2∈G, where µ2(g1, g2) ∈ [0,1] is the probability
associated (by player 3) to s2 = 1 when the choices of players 1 and 2 have been g1
and g2, respectively.
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the Preemption Scenario
Since in PS player 3’s behavior is irrelevant, let us define the PBE focusing on
γ1, γ2 and {µ1(g1)}g1∈G. Let p > 2/3. In a PBE of the PS, the following conditions
must hold:
γ
(s1)
1 (s1 + 2) = 1 for all s1 ∈ {0,1}
γ
(g1,s2)
2 (g1 − 1) = 1 for all g1 ≥ 2 and s2 ∈ {0,1}
µ1(2) = 0, µ1(3) = 1. (4)
Out of the PBE equilibrium path, i.e. when g1 < 2, µ1(g1) is unrestricted.
Depending on the specific values adopted for such belief, the corresponding γ
(g1,s2)
2 (.)
would follow. For completeness, we shall construct a complete PBE of the PS
combining (4) and (5):7
γ
(0,s2)
2 (s2 + 1) = 1 for all s2 ∈ {0,1}
γ
(1,0)
2 (0) = γ(1,1)2 (2) = 1
µ1(g1) = 0 for all g1 < 2. (5)
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the Copycat Scenario
Let p > 2/3. In a PBE of the CS, the following conditions must hold:
7Here we are using the same (out of equilibrium) belief criterion as Feri et al. (2011): if a player
plays suboptimally, successors believe that she has the signal that, conditional on her choice,
minimizes losses.
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γ
(0)
1 (g1) = γ(1)1 (g1) for all g1 ∈ G
γ
(g1,s2)
2 (2) = 1 for all g1 ∈ G and s2 ∈ {0,1}
γ
(g1,g2,s3)
3 (s3 + 2) = 1 for all g2 ≥ 2 and s3 ∈ {0,1}
µ1(g1) = p for all g1 ∈ G
µ2(g1,2) = p for all g1 ∈ G
µ2(g1,3) ≥ p/(3p − 1) for all g1 ∈ G
(6)
Note that, in order to have an equilibrium, it is necessary that player 3 believes,
with a sufficiently high probability, that player 2 is rational: That she does not
choose g2 = 3 when s2 = 0. When g2 < 2, µ2(g1, g2) is unrestricted. Depending on the
specific values adopted for such belief, the corresponding γ
(g1,g2,s3)
3 (.) would follow.
For completeness, we shall construct a complete PBE of the CS combining (6) and
(7):8
γ
(g1,g2,s3)
3 (s3 + 1) = 1 for all g2 < 2 and s3 ∈ {0,1}
µ2(g1, g2) = 0 for all g2 < 2. (7)
B2. Additional statistical evidence: action classification method
We now look at the effects of off-equilibrium behavior of player 1 on players’
winning chances and the resulting learning dynamics using the action classification
method. In PS we look at the consequences of player 1’s deviation from her optimal
fully revealing strategy; in CS we focus on the effects, on behalf of player 1, of using
a signaling strategy, either revealing or fooling.9 In both cases, we look at the full
dataset first and then we split it into the first (last) ten rounds, in search of possible
learning effects.
• PS: Is my predecessor’s mistake a curse or a bless?
As we know from the prediction for PS, player 1 has a unique -and relatively
simple- optimal guess, which consists of adding 2 to her private signal. We find that
54% (172/320) of choices of player 1 in PS fits this criterion. At the individual level,
the relative frequency of adoption of the equilibrium strategy for the 16 subjects act-
ing as player 1 in PS range from 35% to 70%, with a median of 53%. Figure 2 tracks
the relative frequency with which player 1 deviates from the equilibrium strategy
across rounds. As Figure 2 shows, average trend is decreasing, but suboptimal play
does not seem to vanish as the experiment reaches the end.
We estimate the following random-effect linear probability model:
P (yit = 1) = α + βx1t + uit, (8)
8It can be shown that, independently of the value of µ2(g1, g2) for each g2 < 2 and the cor-
responding best response of player 3 (γ
(g1,g2,s3)
3 ), player 2 never finds it profitable to deviate to
choose g2 < 2.
9Obviously, when looking at an individual action -as opposed to the full sequence- we cannot
define a pooling strategy. As a consequence, it may well happen that some actions we classify as
part of a revealing plan (or fooling) plan are indeed part of a pooling strategy. We are well aware
of this limitation of the action classification method, although the latter can really take advantage
of the panel structure of our dataset, something which is completely neglected by our correlation
method.
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Figure 2: Player 1’s off-equilibrium behavior in PS
where yit = 1 if player i wins the prize in round t and x1t = 1 if player 1 deviates
from the equilibrium strategy (1). Table 2 reports the estimated coefficients using
the full sample. As Table 2 shows, player 2 significantly benefits from player 1’s
deviation (at the 1% level), while the same result does not hold for player 3.
Table 2: Regression of winning probability on specific strategy in PS
Player1 Player2 Player3
Player 1 deviates -0.325*** 0.285*** 0.058
(0.050) (0.054) (0.050)
Constant 0.581*** 0.256*** 0.154***
(0.031) (0.028) (0.033)
Number of Obs 320 320 320
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 3 splits the dataset between the first and last 10 rounds. Here we find
that, in the first 10 rounds, both players 2 and 3 benefit from player 1’s deviation.
However, in the second half of the experiment only player 2 gains, and twice as much
with respect to the first half. These results suggest that the learning effects enhance
player 2’s positional advantage over player 3 in the continuation of the game.
Table 3: Regression of winning probability on specific strategy in PS
First 10 rounds Last 10 rounds
Player1 Player2 Player3 Player1 Player2 Player3
Player 1 deviates -0.324*** 0.199** 0.134** -0.337*** 0.387*** -0.049
(0.077) (0.091) (0.068) (0.047) (0.059) (0.071)
Constant 0.597*** 0.290*** 0.108*** 0.570*** 0.230*** 0.200***
(0.062) (0.051) (0.032) (0.022) (0.037) (0.039)
Obs. 160 160 160 160 160 160
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Figure 3: Player 1’s off-equilibrium behavior in CS
• CS: Does Fooling Work?
In CS we focus on the effects of strategic manipulation. In this context, “fooling”
on behalf of player 1 is defined as a guessing strategy which is incompatible with
the realized signal, namely,
g1 = { 3, if s1 = 00, if s1 = 1
We find that 24.7% (79/320) of choices of player 1 fits this definition. At the
individual level, the frequencies of fooling for the 16 subjects acting as player 1 in
CS ranges from 0% to 50%, with a median of 30%.
By the same token, “revealing” on behalf of player 1 is defined as the equilibrium
guessing strategy in PS, namely, if g1 = s1 +2. We find that 22% (72/320) of choices
of player 1 fits into this category. The individual frequencies of revealing for the 16
subjects acting as player 1 range from 5% to 45%, with a median of 22%. Figure
3 tracks the relative frequencies of use of either strategy across the 20 rounds. As
Figure 3 shows, there is an increasing (decreasing) trend in the frequencies of use of
the revealing (fooling) strategies, respectively.
To analyze the effects of player 1’s signaling on winning probabilities, we estimate
the following random-effect linear probability model:
P (yit = 1) = α + β1x1t + β2z1t + uit, (9)
where yit is a binary index which is positive if player i wins the prize at round t and
x1t (z1t) is positive if player 1 uses the fooling (revealing) strategy, respectively. Table
4 reports the estimation results. As Table 4 shows, if player 1 uses fooling strategy,
her own winning probability increases by 15%, mostly at the expense of player 3. As
for player 2, she seems to benefit from player 1’s fooling. This suggests that player 2
decodes player 1’s signals better than player 3. By contrast the adoption on behalf
of player 1 of a revealing strategy has no significant effect on any player’s winning
probability.
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Table 4: Decoding and learning dynamics in CS (I)
Player1 Player2 Player3
Player 1 fools 0.152** 0.088* -0.219**
(0.068) (0.052) (0.094)
Player 1 reveals -0.000 0.031 -0.025
(0.059) (0.056) (0.087)
Constant 0.253*** 0.129*** 0.611***
(0.032) (0.031) (0.053)
Obs. 320 320 320
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Once again, Table 5 splits the dataset into the first (last) 10 rounds, respectively,
to look for learning effects. As Table 5 shows, benefits from fooling for player 1 are
limited to the first periods only, and disappear as the experiment proceeds. In
the meantime, player 2 (much more than player 3) seems to learn on how to decode
player 1’s fooling, while player 3’s performance does not improve. If player 1 reveals,
this has no significant effects on anyone’s winning expectations.
To summarize: the results for the full sample seem mostly driven by what hap-
pens in the first 10 rounds. In the second half the experiment, the pattern changes
dramatically, in that fooling does not seem sustainable in the long-run.
Table 5: Decoding and learning dynamics in CS (II)
First 10 rounds Last 10 rounds
Player1 Player2 Player3 Player1 Player2 Player3
Player 1 fools 0.230*** -0.009 -0.216** 0.071 0.215*** -0.222*
(0.087) (0.059) (0.110) (0.105) (0.077) (0.123)
Player 1 reveals 0.083 -0.079 0.001 -0.076 0.118** -0.027
(0.103) (0.082) (0.140) (0.061) (0.059) (0.083)
Constant 0.187*** 0.165*** 0.646*** 0.316*** 0.097** 0.570***
(0.044) (0.053) (0.080) (0.051) (0.041) (0.072)
Obs 160 160 160 160 160 160
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 6: Identifying the effect of fooling from revealing in CS
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